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UNITED STATES PRACTICE AND
THE BERING SEA: IS IT CONSISTENT WITH A
NORM OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT?
Timothy D. Smith-
I. INTRODUCrION
The need for management of our planet's oceanic environment on an
ecosystem level has been an important and much discussed topic in
marine science and policy circles.' At least one scholar has argued that
customary international law requires states to manage the earth's oceans
on an ecosystem level rather than by using an "ad hoc" or species-by-
species system.' Ecosystem management provides for a more compre-
hensive approach toward the utilization and protection of resources in a
given geographic area than does species specific management. Not only
does ecosystem management consider complex interrelationships among
* J.D. 1995, University of Maine School of Law.
1. See generally, Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act Reauthori-
zation: Hearings on H.R. 780 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries Management of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
[hereinafter House Hearing]; Implementation of the Fishery Conservation Amendments
of 1990: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter Senate Hearing]; NATIONALMARINEFSHERIES
SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, OUR LIVING OCEANS: THE FrST ANNUAL REPORT
ON THE STATUS OF U.S. LVING MARIN RESOURCES, NOAA TECH. MEM. NMFS-
F/SPO-1 (Nov. 1991) [hereinafter OUR LIVING OCEANS]; Martin H. Belsky, The
Ecosystem Model Mandate for a Comprehensive United States Ocean Policy and Law of
the Sea, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 417 (1989); Natalia S. Mirovitskaya & J. Christopher
Haney, Fisheries Exploitation as a Threat to Environmental Security, 4 MARINE POL'Y,
243-258 (1992); See also Greenpeace v. Franklin, 982 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1992) for
environmental organization's arguments relating to effect on ecosystem and other species
regarding pollock catch.
2. See Martin H. Belsky, Management of Large Marine Ecosystems:Developing a
New Rule of Customary International Law, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 733 (1985).
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species, but it also takes into account considerations such as habitat,
human needs, and air and water quality. Such an analysis does not
merely boil down to, for example, jobs versus spotted owls, or the
commercial Alaskan pollock harvest versus the Steller sea lion,3 but
requires managers to take a broader view of the consequences of their
actions for the benefit of all.
Marine ecosystems like the Bering ecosystem are not made up of
thousands of separate species of plants and animals each acting
autonomously. Rather, they are made up of species which interact with
each other and with their environment and are affected directly and
indirectly by human activities such as commercial fishing and oil
drilling.4 This web of interrelationships between human activities,
natural biological occurrences, marine habitats and the environment is
one example of what is meant by the term "ecosystem. 5
"Ecosystem management" requires that a comprehensive planning
method be undertaken to regulate the "whole ecologic mosaic in a
region. "6 As Professor Belsky notes: "In other words, the premise of the
[ecosystem] model is simply a plea by scientists for holistic or compre-
hensive research and management [of a given geographic area]."' The
ecosystem model theorizes that if an integral species like the Alaska
pollock in the Bering Sea ecosystem is depleted by overfishing, not only
may this significantly affect the human economic interests in the region,'
but it will also affect the habitat and species that are dependent on those
species.9 Thus, the current management system, which sets annual
quotas on individual fish species like pollock, may not be the most
effective way to preserve other important economic and ecological
interests in the ecosystem. A more effective means of ensuring the
health of the Bering Sea and other ecosystems may be to consider a
commercially significant species like pollock as just one, albeit critical,
3. See infra part IV.
4. Belsky, supra note 1, at 448.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. See also EUGENE H. BUCK, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT:
MARINE ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, (updated July 29, 1993).
8. For example, factory trawler crews, on-shore plants, marketers and admini-
strators in the groundfish industry employ 10,000 people nation-wide. Approximately
one-third of these individuals work primarily with pollock. David Holthouse, The
Mystery of the Disappearing Species, NATIONAL WILDLIFE, Dec./Jan. 1995, 34, 39.
9. See infra part IV.
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component of a functioning system, characterized by complex interrela-
tionships, and which must be managed as a whole. 10
Actions taken by the United States with respect to the Bering Sea
ecosystem are important because of their global significance both
economically and ecologically. The behavior of the United States is
important particularly because much of the Bering Sea ecosystem lies
within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In addition, the United
States is seen as the final remaining superpower, and its actions are often
looked to by other nations as an indication of the current standards of
conduct under international law.1'
The purpose of this Comment is to explore whether actual U.S.
government practice supports the emergence of a customary international
law norm requiring nations to engage in marine ecosystem management.
Part II describes the theory that there exists such an emerging interna-
tional law norm. As will be explained, this norm is illustrated by recent
developments in international law, including provisions of the United
Nations Draft Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks 2 and the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (LOS).13
The domestic legal tools that the United States can employ to manage
the marine environment on an ecosystem level are the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),14 the Magnuson Fishery Conservation
and Management Act (Magnuson Act),'" the Marine Mammal Protection
10. See generally Belsky, supra note 1, at 417; Martin H. Belsky, A Strategy to
Avoid Conflicts, 27 OCEANUS 19 (Winter 1984-85). In addition, other legal scholars and
philosophers have written about the interconnectedness of species and the environment,
outlining the importance of maintaining intact ecosystems. See e.g. NILES ELDRIDGE,
THEMINER'S CANARY 220-229 (1991); RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 53-61 (1962).
11. For example, when the United States did not sign the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (LOS), most other industrialized nations followed suit.
12. Draft Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 Dec. 1982, Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.164/22 (Aug. 23, 1994) [hereinafter Draft Agreement].
13. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 62/121
(1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1245 (1982) [hereinafter LOS]. For a description of the
development of LOS, see DAVID 1. ATrARD, THE ExCLUSIvE ECONOMIC ZONE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw, 1-31 (1987); MARTIN I. GLASSNER, NEPTUNE'S DOMAIN 73
(1990).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
15. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Act (MMPA), 16 and the Endangered Species Act (ESA).' 7 These are
explored in Part III.
In order to ascertain whether the United States is using these
domestic tools in accordance with the emerging international duty to
manage on an ecosystem level, Part IV analyzes the actions of the U.S.
government with respect to a specific marine ecosystem, the Bering Sea,
and a specific species, the Walleye pollock (pollock).' 8 The Bering Sea
is "one of the most biologically productive waters of the world."' 9
Unlike many of the United States' erstwhile fishery-rich ecosystems, it
supports a fishery which as recently as 1990 was described as
"healthy.' The pollock is a key species both commercially and
ecologically in the Bering Sea.2' As such, the pollock illustrates the
necessity of management on an ecosystem level and presents an
opportunity for the United States to engage in such management.
This Comment will demonstrate that the United States is moving
away from a species-by-species approach and toward a more comprehen-
sive, ecosystem-oriented approach of management in the Bering Sea.
However, this movement is in its embryonic stages and it remains to be
seen whether the United States will use its domestic tools and engage in
international efforts to successfully support an emerging international
norm requiring ecosystem management.
16. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
17. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
18. Theragra Chalcogramma, also known as the Alaska pollock.
19. Conference on Shared Living Resources of the Bering Sea Region, held under
the auspices of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of
Environmental Protection, Area XI, Legal and Administrative Measures at 5 (Richard
Townsend ed., 1990), held June 5-7, 1990, at the University of Alaska at Fairbanks
(statement by Vera Alexander, Institute of Marine Science/School of Fisheries and Ocean
Science, University of Alaska, Fairbanks) (Gov. Doc., Prex 14.2:R 31/3) [hereinafter
Bering Sea Conference].
20. Id. at 50 (statement of Dr. Clarence G. Pautzke, Executive Director, North
Pacific Fishery Management Council, June 5, 1990).
21. The pollock is an integral part the Bering ecosystem because it is the most
heavily commercially harvested species of fish in the Bering Sea, and in fact, it provides
the largest single-species catch of any fishery in the entire United States. OUR LIVING
OCEANS, supra note 1, at 84. In addition, it is ecologically important because seabirds
and mammals, like the Steller sea lion, depend on it as their major food source (see
discussion infra Part IV). NORTH PACIFIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, FISHERY
MANAGEMENT PLAN AND SUMMARY FOR THE BERING SEA/ALEUTIAN ISLANDS
GROUNDFISH, revised May 1993, App. IV, p. 2 [hereinafter NPFMC PLAN & NPFMC
SUMMARY].
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II. THE EMERGING NORM OF ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT AS CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Development of the Norm
The arguments supporting the emergence of a customary interna-
tional law obligation to manage resources at an ecosystem level are
strong.' State practice reflects acceptance of this emerging norms and
the concept of ecosystem management appears in the text of international
treaties and agreements.2'
In addition to representing the formal adoption of law, treaties can
also often be evidence of custom, because they often represent the
explicit ratification or codification of the practices of states.' The
quintessential example of the marriage between customary international
law and treaty law in the marine context may be the codification in
spirit?' and formF of commonly accepted principles of state practice in
one document-the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Upon the completion of the third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea
22. This section of the Comment relies in large part on the writings of Martin H.
Belsky (Dean and Professor of Law, Albany Law School of Union University) who is
the principal proponent of this argument. In addition to Professor Belsky's writings,
supra notes 1 and 2, other scholars have discussed this idea. See generally notes 1 and
2.
23. See, e.g., Belsky, supra note 1, at 454-461.
24. Belsky, supra notes 1 and 2. See, e.g., Draft Agreement, supra note 12, at
arts. 5, 6(3)(c), 7(d)(2); LOS, supra note 13, pts. V, VII, XII, at 1279-1284, 1286-1291,
1308-1315.
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102, cmt. f (1987).
26. LOS, supra note 13, pmbl. at para. 3&4:
Conscious that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and
need to be considered as a whole,
Recognizing the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with
due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and
oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will promote the
peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of
their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study,
protection and preservation of the marine environment.
Id. at 1271 (emphasis added).
27. The obligation to manage the world's fisheries and living resources is
specifically derived from LOS, pt. V, concerned with EEZs, and pt. VII which concerns
the high seas. See discussion below.
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in 1982, then President Reagan issued a proclamation stating that the
United States considered all the provisions of LOS, except those
regarding sea-bed mining, as binding codifications of customary
international law.' LOS, having been ratified by the requisite number
of nations, entered into force on November 16, 1994.29 While the
United States has not yet ratified this treaty, it has signed it and, as
mentioned above, has stated that it accepts virtually all its provisions as
binding international law.'
Although LOS is the principal treaty addressing international ocean
resources, numerous other formal agreements exist among nations which
address issues concerning identifiable regions or specific economic
problems in a wide variety of forms. Treaties affecting the resources of
the Bering Sea include: The Convention on the Conservation and
Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea (Bering Sea
Pollock Convention);3 the International Convention for the High Seas
Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean of 1952, which created the North
Pacific Fisheries Commission;32 the Convention between the U.S. and
Canada regulating halibut fishing, which created the International Pacific
Halibut Commission;33 and the Convention for the Conservation of
Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean. 4 In addition to these
28. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983) reprinted in 16 U.S.C.
§ 1453 note (1988). The Statement of the President of the United States on Ocean Policy,
preceding his proclamation establishing the Exclusive Economic Zone can be found at
19 WEEKYt COMP. PREs. Doc. 383 (Mar. 10, 1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 461, 464-
465 (1983).
29. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Department of State Dispatch, May
30, 1994, available in LEXIS, Exec Library, DSTATE File. See also Steven
Greenhouse, U.S., Having Won Changes, Is Set to Sign Law of the Sea, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 1994, at A-1.
30. Belsky, supra note 1, at 470. See also Proclamation No. 5030, supra note 28.
31. Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the
Central Bering Sea, June 16, 1994, S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994) reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 67 (1995) (references to Letter of Transmittal and
Submittal not available in I.L.M., refer to TREATY Doc. No. 27, available from U.S.
GPO) [hereinafter Bering Sea Pollock Convention].
32. International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific
Ocean, May 9, 1952, U.S.-Can.-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 382.
33. Convention Between the U.S. & Can. for the Preservation of the Halibut
Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, Mar. 2, 1953, U.S.-Can., 5
U.S.T. 7.
34. North Pacific Anadromous Stocks Convention Act of 1992, Nov. 4, 1992, 106
Stat. 5098.
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treaties, there are roughly 35 separate agreements between the United
States and the former Soviet Union which deal with issues involving the
Bering Sea Region.35
A very important recent development in international ocean
management should also be considered. Widespread recognition that the
world's oceans must be managed on an ecosystem level is evidenced by
the inclusion of the concept of ecosystem management in recent sessions
of the United Nation's Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks.36 These negotiations, which were sponsored by
the General Assembly, are intended to "stave off the destruction of the
world's fisheries."37 While focusing on the specific issues of straddling
and highly migratory fish stocks, these sessions reflect the growing trend
toward adopting precautionary and co-operative approaches to global
fishery management. The "precautionary approach" embodied in the
agreement emerging from the negotiations explicitly takes - ecosystems
into account.3" The following outline of LOS and of the recent
developments concerning high seas fish stocks will demonstrate that such
concern about ecosystems is rooted in the emergence of an international
norm of marine ecosystem management. I
B. Convention on the Law of the Sea
The basic objectives of LOS with regard to protection of the earth's
living marine resources and the marine environment are found in Parts
V, VII and XII of the Convention. Part XII sets forth a general
obligation applicable to both fisheries and the protection of the marine
environment. It contains, in part, a provision which obligates states "to
35. Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 28.
36. David E. Pitt, Pact Eluding Fishing Nations In Talks on Imperiled Species,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1994, at A13, discussing the Draft Agreement for the Implementa-
tion of the Provisions of LOS Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, supra note 12. See also,
Michael D. Lemonick, Too Few Fish in the Sea, TIME, Apr. 4, 1994, at 70. See also,
A Summary Report on the U.N. Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, EARTH NEGOTIATIONs BULL., Int'l Inst. for Sustainable
Development, Vol 7, No. 39, Aug. 29, 1994 [hereinafter Conference -on Straddling
Stocks].
37. Pitt, supra note 36, at A13.
38. Draft Agreement, supra note 12, art. 5, at 3-6.
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protect and preserve the marine environment."3 9 As Professor Belsky
notes, nations "are individually and collectively responsible for their
ocean space, and with other nations, responsible for all the world's
seas. "I Thus, the duty to protect the marine environment appears to be
directly incorporated in the text of LOS.
The obligation to manage the world's fisheries and living marine
resources is codified in Part V, which addresses states' EEZs, and Part
VII which pertains to the high seas. In Part V, articles 61-67 address the
conservation of living marine resources, the utilization of these
resources, and issues regarding straddling stocks, highly migratory
species, marine mammals, and anadromous and catadramous species.
Article 61, entitled "Conservation of living resources," states that the
fishing state must provide proper "conservation and management,"
ensuring that the "maintenance of living resources ... is not endangered
by over exploitation."'" In addition, "the effects on a species associated
with or dependent upon harvested species [should be taken into account]
with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such associated or
dependent species above levels at which their reproduction may become
seriously threatened. "42 These provisions evince a sensitivity toward the
inter-connectedness of living marine resources and create a clear
obligation not to manage on a single species basis.
Part VII addresses the living marine resources on the high seas.'
This includes the right to fish, the duty of states to adopt measures for
the conservation of living resources of the high seas, and the duty of
states to cooperate with regard to the conservation and management of
those resources. It also includes provisions concerning marine mammal
conservation and management.
With regard to the commercial harvest of fish, Part VII of LOS
applies the concept of maximum sustainable yield (MSY)." However,
in harvesting according to the maximum sustainable yield, nations must
take into consideration "relevant environmental ... factors," "fishing
patterns," and "the interdependence of stocks. "I5 In addition, like Article
61 which deals with EEZs, Article 119 requires that nations consider the
39. LOS, supra note 13, art. 192, at 1308.
40. Belsky, supra note 1, at 461.
41. LOS, supra note 13, art. 61(2), at 1281.
42. LOS, supra note 13, art. 61(4), at 1281.
43. LOS, supra note 13, arts. 116-120, at 1290-1291.
44. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
45. LOS, supra note 13, art. 119, at 1291.
U.S. Practice and the Bering Sea
"effects on species associated with or dependent upon harvested species
... with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such associated
or dependent species above levels at which their reproduction may
become seriously threatened. "I Thus, the high seas provisions of Part
VII specifically indicate that other species in the ecosystem are to be
taken into consideration by all fishing nations.
When read together, these Parts of LOS are evidence of an
international law mandate requiring nation states to cooperate in
protecting and preserving the marine ecosystem. Furthermore, they
reflect an emerging consensus that ecosystem management should be
regarded as customary international law.47 Thus, the LOS text provides
ample evidence supporting Professor Belsky's thesis that the system of
ecosystem management is an emerging international law norm. This
thesis is further supported by the fact that the international community
is developing a new convention, the Draft Agreement on Straddling
Stocks, to elaborate on the basic description of rights and duties found
in LOS. For example, the "precautionary approach," outlined in the
Draft Agreement on Straddling Stocks and discussed below, fieshes out
the basic ecosystem management goal of LOS. It may be seen as another
step toward the solidification of the norm of ecosystem management as
part of international law.
C. Draft Agreement on Straddling Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
The Draft Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks (Draft Agreement) was the result of the third
round of discussions held by the U.N. Conference on Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks concluded in New York on
46. LOS, supra note 13, arts. 62(4), at 1281-1282, and 119(1)(b), at 1291. LOS
requires that nations exchange "available scientific information, catch and fishing effort
statistics, and other data relevant to the conservation of fish stocks." LOS, supra note
13, arts. 61(5), at 1281 and 119(2), at 1291.
47. See Belsky, supra note 1; Lourene Miovsky, Solutions in the Convention on the
Law of the Sea to the Problem of Overfishing in the Central Bering Sea: Analysis of the
Convention, Highlighting the Provisions Concerning Fisheries and Enclosed and Semi-
Enclosed Seas, 26 SAN DmGo L. REv. 525,574 (1989) ("The Conventionprovisions also
should be treated as customary international law...."); Jeffrey L. Canfield, Recent
Developments in Bering Sea Fisheries Conservation and Management, 24 OcEAN DEy.
& INT'L L. 257 (1993).
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August 26, 1994.1 The Conference was formed to resolve the issues of
how to deal with fish stocks which occur in the exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) of one state and the high seas, or within the EEZs of two or more
states.49 These issues were not resolved by LOS, and the Conference
came about primarily as a result of calls for straddling and highly
migratory fish stock management at the U.N. Conference on the
Environment and the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.'
The Conference was initiated to try to resolve the contentious issue
of fishing for highly migratory and straddling fish stocks. At the United
Nations Conference on Economic Development (UNCED) the participat-
ing states "admitted to the failure of the international community to
manage global fish resources."'" The U.N. Conference on Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks brought together many of
the delegates who had negotiated LOS with those that had participated in
UNCED. Its purpose was to take measures to establish binding
international standards so that high seas fish stocks would not be further
decimated.52 Thus, the goal of the Conference was to "ensure that there
is an effective mechanism for compliance and enforcement of ...
measures [to stop overfishing], provide for a globally-agreed framework
for regional co-operation, and establish a compulsory, binding dispute
settlement mechanism consistent with UNCLOS." 53
The sections relevant to the emerging norm of ecosystem manage-
ment can be found primarily in the articles of the Draft Agreement
concerning its scope, the duties of states, the "precautionary approach"
and the compatibility of conservation and management measures.' The
scope of the Draft Agreement is important because it applies to areas
48. Conference on Straddling Stocks, supra note 36, at 1. At the time of this
writing the two remaining sessions scheduled to be held in March and April of 1995 had
not yet been convened.
49. Id.
50. Id. The resolution establishing the Conference stipulated that existing problems
regarding straddling stocks and highly migratory fish stocks should be identified and
assessed; mechanisms for improving co-operation between states should be taken into





54. See Draft Agreement, supra note 12, arts. 3-7, at 2-6.
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both within and beyond national jurisdiction.' Thus the Draft
Agreement is important because it requires states to cooperate on
straddling fish stocks which occur within their EEZs and on the high
seas. This development, the requirement of cooperation in the EEZs, is
significant because states have traditionally been reluctant to cede any of
their authority within this exclusive zone.
The Draft Agreement states that it "shall be interpreted and applied
in the context of and in a manner consistent with the provisions of the
Convention."5" The Draft Agreement formally recognizes LOS as the
controlling document, and requires that it be interpreted in a manner
consistent with LOSY Thus, all the provisions of LOS requiring, for
example, cooperation, protection of the marine environment, and a duty
to resolve disputes in a peaceful manner would also presumably apply to
the Draft Agreement on Straddling Stocks.
The Draft Agreement goes one step further toward the preservation
and conservation of the marine environment than does LOS. The
"general principles" section outlines a new and core provision of the
Draft Agreement under which states apply the "precautionary approach"
to the harvest of straddling fish stocks. 8 When harvesting straddling
stocks, states would be required to "adopt ... conservation and
management measures for other species belonging to the same ecosystem
or dependent on or associated with the target species."59 Thus, the
Agreement specifically requires that the effects of fishing on the
ecosystem be recognized and that action be taken to prevent harmful
55. Article 3(1) states:
Except as otherwise provided herein, this Agreement applies to the conserva-
tion and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks
beyond areas under national jurisdiction. Provided that the provisions of
articles 6 and 7 also apply to the conservation and management of straddling
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks within areas under national
jurisdiction.
And article 3(2) states, in part:
In accordance with Part V of the Convention [LOS] the coastal State has the
obligation to conserve and manage straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
fish stocks in areas under its national jurisdiction.
Draft Agreement, supra note 12, arts 3(1) and (2), at 2.
56. The "Convention" refers to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (LOS), Id. art. 4, at 3.
57. "Nothing in this Agreement prejudices the provisions of the Convention." Id.
58. Id. art. 5(c), at 3.
59. Id. art. 5(d), at 3 (emphasis added).
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effects. Finally, the "general principles" section requires that "biodi-
versity" be protected, that environmentally safe gear be utilized, and that
pollution, waste, and discards be minimized to protect both the target
species and "ecologically related species. '"60
The section outlining "the application of the precautionary
approach '61 further clarifies this key concept in the Draft Agreement by
defining the term "precautionary approach." The "precautionary
approach" emphasizes the acquisition and utilization of the best scientific
data available,62 and stipulates that "[s]tates shall be more cautious when
information is poor. "63
Even more critical for purposes of this Comment, the precautionary
approach requires states to consider the "impact of fishing on ...
ecosystems. "I The mention of ecosystem protection is extremely
important because it is an integral part of the Draft Agreement. It
demonstrates a consensus that the yield of the catch should no longer be
the sole focus of commercial fishing operations, and that ecosystem
protection should also be an important consideration in the management
of commercial fishing on straddling stocks. The Draft Agreement also
recognizes that ecosystem protection, and the protection of dependent and
60. Id. art. 5(e)-(f), at 3.
61. Id. art. 6, at 4-5.
62. Id. art. 6(3)(a), at 4.
63. Id. art. 6(2), at 4.
64. Id. art. 6(3), at 4. Subsec. 3 of art. 6 states:
3. States shall apply the precautionary approach in accordance with the
following:
a. in order to improve decision-making for fishery conservation and manage-
ment, States shall obtain and share the best scientific information available and
develop improved techniques for dealing with risk and uncertainty;
b. in determining conservation and management measures, States shall take
into account, inter alia, uncertainties relating to the size and productivity of the
stock(s), precautionary reference points, stock condition in relation to such
reference points, levels and distributions of fishing mortality and the impact of
fishing activities on non-target and ecologically related species, as well as
oceanic, environmental and socio-economic conditions;
c. in managing fish stocks, States shall consider the impacts of fishing on
associated ecosystems. They should develop data collection and research
programmes to assess the impact of fishing on non-target and ecologically
related species and their environment, adopt plans as necessary to ensure the
conservation of such species and consider the protection of habitats of special
concern.
Id. (emphasis added).
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related species, is just as important as the size of the harvest of the target
species. Thus, the major fishing countries of the world, through the
Draft Agreement, have recognized that in order to adequately protect the
target species, a "precautionary approach" toward commercial fishing
must be taken, and that ecosystemic considerations must be at the
forefront when deciding the volume of a commercial harvest.
The Draft Agreement would also require that coastal states and states
fishing the adjacent high seas "cooperate" to ensure that the measures
they are taking regarding the fish stock are compatible, and that these
measures "do not result in undue harmful impact on living marine
resources as a whole, including associated and dependant species."'
Here again, it is clear that the Draft Agreement focuses on a holistic
approach to fishing, giving clear instruction that the ecosystem and the
other species therein be given due regard.
The United States actively participated in the working group
discussions of Draft Agreement on Straddling Stocks,' and currently
supports the conclusion of a legally binding agreement.67 This support
can be seen as more than mere compliance with the duties set forth in
LOS, requiring cooperation in the management of straddling fish stocks.
It also reflects a stronger move by the United States toward the explicit
recognition of the customary international law norms evinced by LOS.
In addition, U.S. participation and its support for a legally binding
document also signifies that the United States has adopted, at least
rhetorically, the idea of a "precautionary approach" toward fishing. This
approach includes a consideration and analysis of fishing on the
ecosystem at issue. By participating in the Draft Agreement, the actions
of the United States strengthen the international law norm, also espoused
in LOS, of cooperation regarding fishery issues.
In fact, the duty to cooperate as set forth in the Draft Agreement,
may envision international agreements specifically like the Convention
on the Conservation of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea
(Bering Sea Pollock Convention).6  The fact this Convention was signed
by all the nations that participated may even indicate that the customary
norm to cooperate regarding straddling stocks already exists and is being
observed.
65. Id. art. 7(2), at 5-6.
66. See generally, Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19.
67. Pitt, supra note 36, at A13.
68. Supra note 31.
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D. Toward an Emerging Duty of Ecosystem Management
Treaties and agreements such as LOS and the Draft Agreement on
Straddling Stocks represent a trend toward managing the earth's vast
ocean regions under ecosystem conservation and management schemes. 6
This trend of state practice, i.e. the formation of agreements that
consider ecosystems, represents the evolution of a new customary
international law norm. However, it still remains to be seen to what
degree the United States will follow the mandates outlined in LOS and
the Draft Agreement. The fact that the United States has signed and
actively participated in drafting these treaties and agreements not only
69. In addition to LOS and the Draft Agreement on Straddling Stocks, other
evidence of international action reflecting the emerging norm exists. For example, the
United Nations has enacted several resolutions regarding high seas driftnet fishing. The
most recent of which, Resolution On Large-Scale Driftnet Fishing And Its Impact On
The Living Marine Resources of The World's Oceans And Seas, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/46/215, 31 I.L.M. 241 (1991) was passed in 1991. In it the General Assembly
expressed "deep concern" about the impact of driftnet usage, and established a global
moratorium on large-scale driftnet fishing as of December 31, 1992. In this resolution,
the General Assembly cited its other resolutions regarding drifinet fishing, specifically
Resolution 44/225 (29 I.L.M. 1555 (1990)). Resolution 44/225 outlined in detail
concerns the effects of driftnet fishing, including that:
in addition to targeted species of fish, non-targeted fish, marine mammals,
seabirds and other living marine resources of the world's oceans and seas can
become entangled in large-scale pelagic driftnets, either in those in active use
or in those that are lost or discarded, and as a result of such entanglement are
often either injured or killed.
Id. at 1556.
Thus, In addition to the treaties cited above and the domestic legislation cited below,
international legal documents and domestic legislation express concern for ecosystems
and reflect the evolving norm toward addressing problems on an ecosystemic level.
These international concerns are also reflected in domestic law. The issue of large-scale
driftnet fishing is addressed in 16 U.S.C. § 1826 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In the
"findings" section, the law states that Congress finds that;
(7) increasing population pressures and new knowledge of the importance of
living marine resources to the health of the global ecosystem demand that
greater responsibility be exercised by persons fishing or developing new
fisheries beyond the exclusive economic zone of any nation.
16 U.S.C. § 1826(b)(7) (1988 & Supp. H 1990) (emphasis added). The Act goes on to
list sanctions that may be levied against foreign countries for violating it.
U.S. Practice and the Bering Sea
means the treaties themselves should be binding on the United States,7"
but also demonstrates that U.S. practice has been to support this recent
trend of addressing marine problems on a regional and ecosystemic level.
Therefore, the above-mentioned treaties may be considered as evidence
of emerging U.S. acceptance of the understanding that our planet's
oceans must be managed on a cooperative basis to avoid the patchwork
approach that would result from each state trying to manage ocean
resources on its own.
Thus, based on the practice of nations forming treaties and
agreements, and the actions of states which deal with specific regions and
ocean management, culminating in LOS and the Draft Agreement on
High Seas Fish Stocks, a strong case can be made to support Professor
Belsky's thesis that there exists a binding rule of customary international
law regarding ecosystem management, even on nations that have not
signed or ratified LOS. The fact that LOS itself has been accepted and
"confirmed by state practice," 7 further strengthens this reasoning. The
question that remains, however, is whether U.S. actions under its
domestic legal authority are consistent with the customary norm. To
answer this, one may look to recent U.S. practice with respect to the
resources of the Bering Sea. Before doing so, however, it is useful to
consider the framework of U.S. marine resource laws.
m. DOMESTIC LAW, U.S. PRACTICE, AND THE THEORY OF A
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL NORM OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT
In addition to the customary international law and treaties mentioned
above, both of which are part of our domestic law,' the United States
has enacted a patchwork of interlocking domestic legislation which
addresses protection of living marine resources. The most important of
these laws are the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson Act),
the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) and the Endangered
Species Act (ESA). Accepting the premise that the United States has an
international law duty to manage on an ecosystem level, it must be
70. Treaty law carries the same weight as domestic law in the United States, U.S.
CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2, except when it is specifically overridden by domestic legislation.
See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
71. Belsky, supra note 1, at 463.
72. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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ascertained whether or not U.S. regulations, legislation and legal system
observe this norm.
The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976
(Magnuson Act) is the single most important piece of domestic legislation
in regard to our nation's fisheries. 3  The Magnuson Act contains
provisions enabling management of domestic fisheries on an ecosystem
level. However, like much current domestic legislation affecting living
marine resources, it also can be used to manage in an "ad hoc" manner.74
The tools that would enable the United States to manage its fisheries
on an ecosystem level begin with the Regional Fishery Management
Councils75 which are responsible for developing fishery management
plans (FMPs) 6 for the species within their geographic areas in accor-
dance with "optimum yield"' and "maximum sustainable yield""
principles.79  The regional councils operate in cooperation with the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) of the National Oceanic and
73. Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified in 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 as amended (1988 & Supp.
V 1993) [hereinafter Magnuson Act]. Section 1801(a)(6) describes one purpose for
enacting the legislation as "[a] national program for the conservation and management
of the fishery resources of the United States is necessary to prevent overfishing, to
rebuild overfished stocks, to insure conservation, and to realize the full potential of the
Nation's fishery resources." 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1988). Section 1851 sets forth the
fishery conservation and management standards which must be followed in every
domestic fishery. 16 U.S.C. § 1851 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
74. For a discussion of the benefits of "ad hocism" in the Bering ecosystem see
Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19 at 52-54, (statement of Dr. Clarence G. Pautzke,
Executive Director of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(1)-(8) (1988). The Magnuson Act established eight
Regional Fishery Management Councils each covering a different geographic region of
the United States. Id.
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1990).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(4) (1988). "The term optimum with respect to the yield
from a fishery, means the amount of fish which will provide the greatest overall benefit
to the Nation, with particular reference to food production and recreational opportunities;
and which is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield from each
fishery, as modified by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factors." 50 C.F.R.
§ 602.11(0(1) (1994).
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(3) (1988). The term "maximum sustainable yield" is
further defined in 50 C.F.R. § 602.11(d) (1994).
79. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(4); 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h) (1988).
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Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and their fishery management
plans are subject to approval by the Secretary of Commerce.81
The fishery management plans must be drafted in accordance with
the "[n]ational standards for fishery conservation and management" set
forth in the Magnuson Act.8 The standards require that "[c]onservation
and management measures shall prevent overfishing and insure, on a
continuing basis the optimum yield from each fishery."I In addition, the
standards state that "[t]o the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish
shall be managed as a unit throughout its range, and interrelated stocks
of fish shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination."I This
language indicates Congressional recognition of the necessity, when
dealing with a fish stock, of taking into consideration other species of
fish and the entire area the species inhabits. In addition, through the
establishment of the regional councils, Congress has acknowledged the
need for sensitivity toward regional ecosystems. Because the regional
councils have expertise in a particular geographic area, this ostensibly
allows for closer supervision of the ecosystems within each jurisdiction.
It is noteworthy that the term "conservation and management," as
used in the Magnuson Act, specifically requires the protection and
preservation of the "marine environment. "I In addition, the fishery
80. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852(h), 1854(a) (1988). See also C&W Fish Co. v. Fox, 931
F.2d 1556, 1557-8 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (describing the FMP approval process under the
Magnuson Act).
81. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The meaning of this state-
ment is made even more clear, "[tihere should be no uncertainty that the basic goal of
management is to protect the productivity of fisk stocks." A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
685 (Comm. Print 1976).
83. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(3) (1988).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (1988). This section of the Magnuson Act states in
relevant part:
The term 'conservation and management' refers to all of the rules, regulations,
conditions, methods, and other measures (A) which are required to rebuild,
restore, or maintain, and which are useful in rebuilding, restoring, or
maintaining, any fishery resource and the marine environment; and (B) which
are designed to assure that-
(i) a supply of food and other products may be taken, and that
recreational benefits may be obtained, on a continuing basis;
(iH) irreversible or long-term adverse effects on fishery resources and the
marine environment are avoided; and
(iii) there will be a multiplicity of options available with respect to the
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management councils are required to consider measures which are
"necessary and appropriate for the conservation and management of the
fishery to prevent overfishing, and to protect, restore, and promote the
long term health and stability of the fishery."I The councils must also
take into account marine habitats and changes in those marine habitats
when developing FMPs.' Therefore, the provisions of the Magnuson
Act mandate the protection and preservation of the marine environment
to promote healthy and stable fisheries. In addition, they specifically
require that marine habitats be taken into consideration.
Finally, the fishery management plan must be "consistent with
national standards, the other provisions of this [Act], regulations
implementing recommendations by international organizations in which
the United States participates ... and any other applicable law."' Thus,
this provision requires the FMPs to be both consistent with formal
international law and any other applicable law which would presumably
include both customary international law and "any other" domestic
legislation.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) falls within the ambit
of "other" domestic legislation.88 The goal of the MMPA is to ensure
that mammalian species do not diminish "beyond the point at which they
cease to be a significant functioning element in the ecosystem of which
they are part. "89 The Act imposes a moratorium on the "taking"' 9 of
marine mammals as its primary means of their protection.9 However,
this moratorium contains many statutory exceptions which allow takings
future uses of these resources.
Id. (emphasis added).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1 1990) (emphasis added). In addition,
section 1853(a)(7) requires the councils to include in their fishery management plans
"information regarding the significance of habitat to the fishery and assessment as to the
effects which changes to that habitat may have on the fishery." 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(7)
(Supp. 11 1990) (emphasis added).
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(7) (1988).
87. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(1)(C) (Supp. 1 1990).
88. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(2) (1988).
90. "Take" is defined in 16 U.S.C. § 1362 as follows, "The term 'take' means to
harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine
mammal." 16 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988).
91. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (1988).
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of marine mammals, including the incidental take in commercial fishing
operations. 92
The "primary objective" of the Marine Mammal Protection Act is to
ensure that any actions affecting marine mammals are consistent with the
maintenance of the "health and stability of the ecosystem"' which they
inhabit.' Thus, the MMPA explicitly requires consideration of eco-
systems when marine mammals are involved. One of the problems with
the "ecosystem" protection requirement of the MMPA, however, is that
the Act does not clearly set forth an enforcement mechanism or
guidelines as to how the ecosystem should be protected. 5 In addition,
the MMPA does not define certain critical terms such as what is meant
by "health" or "ecosystem."' Thus, the MMPA can be viewed as a
piece of U.S. domestic legislation affecting the marine environment
which reflects the customary international law norm that ecosystems be
92. The "taking" issues which arise under the MMPA are beyond the scope of this
Comment. However, it should be noted that the "incidental take" provisions of the
MMPA, recognize that marine mammals are, in a sense, "associated species"; and the
regulation of fish stocks can affect marine mammal populations. See infra IV text, for
a discussion of the possible effect of the Alaska pollock harvest on the Steller sea lion
and other marine mammals. See also the 1994 amendments to the Marine Mammal
Protection Act which establish a comprehensive approach to setting incidental take
quotas. H.R. REP. No. 439, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994).
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6) (1988).
94. Id. For a detailed discussion of the specific interaction between provisions of
the MMPA and the Magnuson Act see James A.R. Nafziger, The Management of Marine
Mammals After the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, 14 WILLAME=rE L.J.
153 (1977).
95. Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 100 (paper by Donald Baur, attorney
with Perkins Cole, a Washington D.C. law firm).
96. Nafziger, supra note 94 at 170. Prof. Nafziger, in his article, raises the
question regarding what is meant by the term "health of the ecosystem." He says, in
part:
The "health of the ecosystem" is not defined, nor is it susceptible to effective
definition. Both terms, "health" and "ecosystem" are unclear. For example,
is this particular reference intended to include the "stability" of the ecosystem,
as the primary objective of the Act declares, or is the absence of this additional
word in the definition of OSP significant? If so, what is the significance? Is
the term "stability" redundant? Is the "health" of the ecosystem improved even
if it means depletions of fish stocks? Is man, with all his baggage of additional
values, to be considered a part of the marine ecosystem? Is the "health" of the
ecosystem furthered by selective lowering of marine mammal stocks for their
own good or that of the habitat?
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taken into consideration. However, it falls short of being entirely
satisfactory in that it fails to define key terms and contains no mechanism
to effectuate its underlying policy. 7
Protection for species also exists in the Endangered Species Act
(ESA).9" The ESA protects species in three primary ways. First, it
closes the U.S. market to trafficking in endangered wildlife, or parts
thereof, in an effort to stem the destruction of endangered species.
Second, it prohibits "taking"" species and imposes criminal sanctions on
anyone who does."'° Finally, and most significantly for the purposes of
this Comment, Section 7 of the ESA prohibits any federal action which
has a destructive effect on a species or its habitat.10'
97. See discussion at infra notes 106-110. However, the possibility that the MMPA
may be enforced through other pieces of domestic legislation may exist. For example,
certain provisions of the MMPA, such as the concept of a "depleted" stock or species,
may be enforced through the Endangered Species Act.
98. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The protection of species
which fall within the ESA's definitions of threatened or endangered have been given the
"highest" protection by the Supreme Court. In TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1977), the
Court stated that "examination of the language, history and structure of the legislation
under review here [i.e. Section 7 of the ESA] indicates beyond doubt that Congress
intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities" and that the species
be saved "whatever the cost." Id. at 174, 184.
99. The ESA defines "take" as "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(10)
(1988). However, there appears to be a split between Circuit courts as to what exactly
the term "harm" means. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d
1106 (9th Cir. 1988); contra Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon
v Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1988).
101. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1)-(a)(2) (1988) which states:
(1) The Secretary shall review other programs administered by him and utilize
such programs in furtherance of the purpose of this chapter. All other Federal
agencies shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary,
utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by
carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and
threatened species listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title.
(2) Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and the assistance of the
Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such
agency (hereinafter referred to as 'agency action') is not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or
result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species....
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The Act mandates that before any government action can occur, the
agency involved must take affirmative steps to protect the affected
species and to insure that its "action"" is not likely to "jeopardize" the
"existence" or "habitat" of the species. 10  The concept of agency
"action" under the ESA is important. Once a federal agency undertakes
an "action" which may jeopardize a listed species, a formal interagency
consultation process is triggered." The acting agency must consult with
the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or the National Marine and
Fisheries Service (NMFS) and obtain a biological opinion outlining the
FWS or NMFS view on whether the action in question is permissible.
The required determination is made by the agency at issue in consultation
with the National Marine and Fisheries Service or the Fish and Wildlife
Service.105
Therefore, the ESA has a formal interagency consultation process,
which the MMPA lacks. A listed species would theoretically be
protected from adverse agency action by these provisions. It should be
noted that agency "action" under the Endangered Species Act may also
rise to the level of a major federal action which would require an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under NEPA. Even if no EIS is
ultimately required, the ESA still requires a biological opinion if a listed
species is affected. Therefore, the ESA mandates a review and
consultation by the Secretary where a listed species is involved, which
would not be required if no listed species were present. In addition, in
a biological opinion, it may be determined that a full EIS is necessary.
However, as discussed below in the context of Greenpeace v. Franklin,"5
the threshold for this determination may be quite high.
When the two laws are seemingly in conflict, the more restrictive
provision of the ESA or MMPA applies to any species listed under the
102. Id. Within the parameters of the ESA, there is a question as to what exactly
constitutes "action." See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir.
1980), in which the court held that the sale of oil leases in the Beaufort Sea, home to the
endangered Bowhead whale, did not constitute agency action because it was only one step
in a process over which the agency had control, not a distinct action in and of itself. Id.
103. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988). An "action" would "jeopardize" a species if it
"reasonably would be expected ... to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the
survival and recovery" of the affected species by being detrimental to its population,
reproduction or the area which it inhabits. 50 C.F.R. § 402.2 (1991).
104. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (1988).
105. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988).
106. 983 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1992).
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ESA.'1 For example, if a species is considered "depleted" under the
MMPA, 08 the moratorium on taking under the ESA would be put into
effect. Thus, "taking" a "depleted" species would not be allowed, even
if the species was not "listed" under the ESA.'1 If a species is listed
pursuant to the ESA, it is automatically considered "depleted" for
purposes of the MMPA."0 A "depleted" species may therefore receive
protection under the MMPA, even though it may not be listed under the
ESA.
Like the MMPA, the ESA includes a policy to protect "the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend."'' The ESA also has a mechanism by which habitat conserva-
tion plans considering "ecosystems" may be provided. 12
The National Environmental Policy Act could provide a mechanism
with which to integrate all of the provisions in the various pieces of
domestic legislation relevant to marine ecosystems."' NEPA "requires
federal agencies [to] adopt an 'integrated' approach to planning and
decision making and include in every recommendation and report for
'major federal actions"' 4 a detailed environmental impact statement that
describes adverse environmental effects." ' 5
Professor Belsky has argued that any major federal action taken
pursuant to NEPA, and any actions which are taken pursuant to the ESA
107. 16 U.S.C. § 1543 (1988).
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(1) (1988).
109. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(b)(3) (1988).
110. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(1) (1988).
111. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988) states:
Purposes. The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may
be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered
species and threatened species, and to take such steps as may be appropriate
to achieve the purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth in subsection
(a) of this section.
Id.
112. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988).
113. Belsky, supra note 1, at 489.
114. For a discussion of what constitutes a "major federal action" under NEPA, see
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
Essentially, however, the question of what constitutes a "major federal action" has been
addressed by the Council on Environmental Quality which defined the term at 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.18 (1990).
115. Belsky, supra note 1, at 490, (quoting 42 U.S.C § 4332 (1986)).
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are required to be consistent with the ecosystem model." 6 NEPA
requires an Environmental Impact Statement for major federal action
which involves an analysis of the impact on the whole environment in
question. The ESA requires a consultation with the NMFS or FWS and
generally the issuance of a biological opinion if the action affects a listed
species. Therefore governmental action, like a fishery management plan
for the Bering Sea, l i7 must consider the health and stability of the
ecosystem and not jeopardize any endangered or threatened species or
marine mammal in that ecosystem. Professor Belsky argues persuasively
that current domestic legislation, in conjunction with NEPA, can provide
a means of managing marine resources and environments on an
ecosystem level."'
While the preceding review supports the argument that the tools
currently exist to manage the marine environment on an ecosystem level,
what remains at issue is whether the United States is actually using these
tools to that end. Despite all of the provisions of international and
domestic law cited above, a practical problem still exists. The United
States has no one piece of legislation, much less one agency, responsible
for managing marine resources on an ecosystem level. Although there
exists no single authority governing ecosystem management, it is clear
that the tools outlined in the different pieces of legislation above allow
for the possibility of ecosystem management. Assuming that ecosystem
management is an emerging international law norm, is the United States
using its tools and abiding by the concepts espoused in international
agreements such as LOS?
With the background of the international law and U.S. domestic law
concerning living marine resource management in mind, an analysis of
management efforts for a major ecosystem and its key species is useful.
It can help to answer the question of whether the United States is using
the tools available to it to manage the competing ecological and
commercial interests involved on an ecosystem level. As stated, the
pollock fishery is important because, not only is it an integral part of the
116. Belsky, supra notes 1 and 2.
117. Even setting the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for pollock (a much less signi-
ficant action than establishing an FMP) by the NPFMC constitutes an action subject to
ESA Section 7(A)(2) and NEPA review. See Greenpeace v. Franklin, 982 F.2d 1342,
1346 (9th Cir. 1992).
118. Belsky, supra note 1, at 489-91.
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Bering ecosystem,1 9 but it also represents the largest single species catch
of all the fisheries in the United States"2 and its ecosystem is imperiled
by overfishing"
IV. THE BERING ECOSYSTEM-AN ECOLOGICALLY COMPLEX WEB
The Bering Sea" gets its name from a Russian admiral who Czar
Peter ordered to explore the region in 1725.1' 3 It is one of the earth's
most diverse and resource rich ecosystems."2 More than 90 percent of
the Bering Sea is located within the EEZs of the United States and
Russia,"25 with the exception of an enclave of high seas between the two
119. EUGENE H. BUCK, MARINE MAMMAL ISSUES, 92126 CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF (updated Feb. 18, 1994) 12; Mirovitskaya & Haney, supra
note 1, at 247; A.M. Springer et al., Seabird Responses to Fluctuating Prey Availability
in the Eastern Bering Sea, MARINEECOLOGYPROGRESS SERIES, Vol. 32, 1986, pp. 1-12.
120. OUR LIVING OCEANS, supra note 1, at 84.
121. Mirovitskaya & Haney, supra note 1, at 246-7.
122. The surface area of the Bering Sea is approximately 2,275,000 square kilo-
meters. It has a mean depth of 1,636 meters. Its floor consists of approximately 44
percent continental shelf, 43 percent abyssal plain, and 13 percent continental slope. See
Canfield, supra note 47, at 258 (citing D.W. Hood & E.J. Kelly, Oceanography of the
Bering Sea, with Emphasis on Renewable Resources, Occasional Publication no. 2
(Fairbanks Alaska: Institute of Marine Science, University of Alaska, 1974)). "[FI]or
information on the interrelationships between biological, chemical, meteorological, and
geological factors affecting the Bering Sea Ecosystem," see id.
123. Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 22 (paper given by Nicholas
Robinson of the Center for Environmental Legal Studies at Pace University School of
Law).
124. U.S. DEPARTMENT OFCOMMERCE, NOAA TECH. MEM., NMFS F/AKR-2, AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE LIVING MARINE RESOURCES OF THE CENTRAL BERING SEA AND
POTENTIAL RESOURCE USE CONFLICTS BETWEEN COMMERCIAL FISHERIES AND
PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT IN THE NAVARIN BASIN, PROPOSED SALE No. 83. (prepared
by Byron F. Morris, January 1981) [hereinafter NOAA TECH. MEM.]; Canfield, supra
note 47, at 258; Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 5-11 (remarks by Vera
Alexander of the Institute of Marine Science/School of Fisheries and Ocean Science,
University of Alaska, Fairbanks); Colin Nickerson, Stripping the Sea's Life, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 17, 1994, at 1.
125. See Figure 1, p. 165. Convention on the Conservation and Management of
Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994) (statement of David A. Colson,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans Affairs), available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, CNGTST File [hereinafter Hearing on Central Bering Sea Convention].
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Figure 1. The North Pacific Ocean
Source: NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
OUR LIVING OCEANS: ANNUAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF U.S. LIVING MARINE
RESOURCES, 1993, NOAA Tech. Mem. NMFS-F/SPO (Dec. 1993).
EEZs called the "Donut Hole."'2 Its living marine resource richness and
biodiversity are primarily the results of hydrological conditions
governing the area.127 These conditions produce the ideal habitat for the
complex food web that exists in the Bering Sea."
Prior to the establishment by Russia and the United States of their
EEZs, a virtual fishing "free-for-all" existed in the Bering Sea groundfish
fishery.'" Since the United States established its EEZ, it has gradually
increased its domestic fishing presence, pursuant to the underlying policy
126. See Figure 1, p. 165 of this Comment for a diagram. The Donut Hole has a
surface area of about 48,000 square miles and is located in a pocket of high seas between
U.S. and Russian EEZs. Canfield, supra note 47, at 259.
127. Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 5-11 (remarks by Vera Alexander
of the Institute of Marine Science/School of Fisheries and Ocean Science, University of
Alaska, Fairbanks).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 36-7 (statement by James Brooks, Deputy Director, Alaska Office,
NMFS, NOAA); Canfield, supra note 47, at 266.
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of the Magnuson Act.' 3° Foreign presence has decreased to the point
where it is no longer extant in the U.S. EEZ and these ships must fish
elsewhere.3' The fact that 90 percent of fish stocks now exist within
different nations' EEZs, 32 coupled with the general decline in the
world's fish stocks, 3 3 have caused resource-rich areas which lie outside
the EEZs, like the Donut Hole, to be over-exploited.' 4 Nations have
threatened, and actually resorted to, military deployments to ensure that
this overfishing does not encroach on their fish stocks.'35 As the world's
fish stocks continue to plummet, military action may become more and
more of a reality.
The question of whether the United States is using its domestic
legislation, regulations, and its regional councils effectively to preserve
pollock stocks, an important element of the Bering ecosystem, remains
unanswered. The major impediment to preventing overfishing and any
concomitant alteration to the ecosystem in pollock and other species, is
the existence of conflicting government objectives inherent in the
130. See generally, 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4), (6), (7); (b)(1), (3), (6) (1988) "to
encourage the development by the United States fishing industry of fisheries which are
currently underutilized or not utilized by United States fishermen, including bottom fish
off Alaska, and to that end, to ensure that optimum yield determinations promote such
development" (emphasis added). 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(6) (1988). See also Bering Sea
Conference, supra note 19, at 50 (statement of Dr. Clarence G. Pautzke, Executive
Director, NPFMC).
131. Foreign fishing predominated when the Magnuson Act first became effective
in 1977. However, during the 1980's joint venture fishing superseded foreign fishing
which precipitously dropped off and ended entirely in 1988. By 1989, joint venture
fishing was also rapidly declining and was being displaced by a solely domestic fishery.
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OSC STUDY,
MMS 90-0026, COMMERCIAL FISHING INDUSTRY OF THE BERING SEA, (June 1990). See
also Canfield, supra note 47, at 259.
132. R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 126 (1983).
133. For an overview of overfishing and the economics of fishing see TONY J.
PITCHER & PAUL J.B. HART, FISHERIES ECOLOGY 77-109 (1982).
134. Canfield, supra note 47, at 259. Nickerson, supra note 124, at 1, 24-25.
135. In fact, the United States Coast Guard seized roughly a dozen foreign vessels
illegally fishing in the U.S. EEZ between May, 1989 and July, 1992. Canfield, supra
note 47, at 261. Russia has not only deployed warships within its EEZ, but within
international waters to "dissuade" Polish, South Korean, Japanese, and Chinese fishing
in international waters it claims to have "management" rights over. Nickerson, supra
note 123, at 24. Canada has also recently seized one Spanish groundfishing vessels and
cut the nets off another in waters just beyond its EEZ. Clyde H. Farnsworth, When They
Talk About Fish, the Mellow Canadians Bellow, N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 1995, at All.
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Magnuson Act itself.'36 "Conservation" measures are often in direct
conflict with the incentives the government has created to actively
promote investment in the domestic fishing industry.37 These incentives,
however, appear to have caused a severe over-capitalization of our
domestic fishing fleet in the Bering Sea.3 8 For example, the size of the
U.S. trawler fleet in the Bering region has increased from 12 vessels in
1986 to 65 today. 39 Thus, the U.S. governmental interest in promoting
investment conflicts with the "conservation and management" objectives
of the Magnuson Act. The regional fishery management councils seem
to be having difficulty in finding a balance which would allow them to
carry out their "conservation and management" tasks. 114
136. See generally, Senate Hearing supra, note 1.
137. E.g., Tax incentives for vessel construction are included in the Capital
Construction Fund program and Title XI Loan Guarantee Program. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1271-
1279 (1988). The United States has created such incentives primarily through favorable
loan programs and subsidies to domestic fishing interests. Id. The result has been a
fishing fleet that is largely overcapitalized. However, the United States is by no means
alone in pursuing subsidies to its nationals. Colin Nickerson, supra note 124, at 25.
138. See, e.g., Steve Wilhelm, Bottom Fish Fleet in Dire Straits, PUGET SOUND
Bus. J., Aug. 13, 1993, at 1.
139. Holthouse, supra note 8, at 37. These vessels, which process the pollock
catch on board cost between $40-75 million each and can reach lengths of more than 100
yards. Id. If a ban on pollock fishing were imposed, a 65 percent decrease in the
harvest in the Bering Sea would result. Id. at 38. It is noteworthy that this trend toward
over-capitalization of the Bering fleet is reflected internationally in the fact that the
fishing nations of the world spend $92 billion every year to land $70 billion worth of
fish. Colin Nickerson, supra note 124, at 25.
140. E.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFcEREPORT, FISHERIES: COMMERCE NEEDS
TO IMPROvEISHERmSMANAGEMENTINTHENORTHPACIC (GAO/RCED 91-96) (Mar.
1991); See also Editorial, Reform Fshery Council-Create Stability in System ofResource
Allocation, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 6, 1992, at A6, in which the Department of
Commerce Inspector General's Office and the Justice Department are said to have
criticized the NPFMC's recommendation regarding processing of pollock and cod as
"flawed." The NPFMC, which has jurisdiction over the Bering ecosystem, is made up
of 11 members. Seven represent commercial fishing interests, and four are government
employees. Holthouse, supra note 8, at 38.
See also ALASKA DAILY NEWS, editorial of Dec. 12, 1991: ("The council system
is ethically bankrupt. We don't let Exxon, Arco and BP run the Alaska States
Department of Environmental Conservation. We don't put people from the phone and
electric companies in charge of the Public Utilities Commission. We shouldn't turn
federal fisheries over to fishermen whose decisions directly affect their personal
futures."); Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 54 (remarks by Bert Larkins, consultant,
American Factory Trawler Association) (citing ALASKA DAILYNEWS, editorial, Dec. 12,
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In fact, one third of the stocks managed by the regional councils are
at lower levels than before the councils came into existence.' 41 While
U.S. landings increased by about 3 billion pounds between 1984 and
1991,142 "virtually all of that increase is attributable to the Americaniza-
tion of the pollock resource in the North Pacific." 43 Moreover, although
the U.S. Department of Commerce hails the Magnuson Act's effect on
this fishery as, "one of the great success stories for development of a
U.S. groundfish industry,"" the increased tonnage of the catch may be
only half of the story. The disastrous ecological ramifications of the
increase in fishing for groundfish such as pollock are currently being
felt. 145
In 1977, when the Magnuson Act's 200 mile limit went into effect,
the domestic fishing industry had no pollock harvest in the North Pacific
Ocean."4 Yet, from 1975-1979, international landings totaled approxi-
mately 4.5 million metric tons in the entire North Pacific Ocean. 47 By
1987, the total international harvest of pollock had reached almost 7
million tons, causing worries that the "regional ecosystem [wa]s likely
to suffer from further changes in pollock abundance. '"" By 1990, the
domestic harvest alone was 1.4 million metric tons. 49 In 1992, in all
U.S. EEZ waters, fishing by the U.S. fleet surpassed previous foreign
fishing totals. 50 Thus, 15 years after the enactment of the Magnuson
Act, the United States was exceeding the high harvests, in pollock and
all other fishing totals, that brought about the passage of the Act in the
first place. This, too, calls into question the effectiveness of the priority
placed on the "conservation" requirements in the Magnuson Act.
1991).
141. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 55 (statement of H.A. Larkins, Consultant,
American Factory Trawler Association).
142. Id. From 6.44 billion to 9.4 billion pounds. Id. at 55.
143. Id.
144. OUR LIVING OCEANS, supra note 1, at 84-85.
145. See generally NOAA TECH. MEM., supra note 124, at 94, outlining the fact
that there was worry that the pollock fishery was in danger as early as 1981. This
memorandum cites evidence which "indicates a deteriorating stock and a worsening
condition of the resource in the Bering Sea." See also, Holthouse, supra note 8.
146. OR LIVING OCEANS, supra note 1, at 85.
147. Mirovitskaya & Haney, supra note 1, at 246.
148. Id. at 247.
149. Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 49.
150. Senate Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Greenpeace at 111).
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The effectiveness of U.S. "conservation and management" measures
regarding marine ecosystems under the Magnuson Act have been cause
for concern as well.15 1 Evidence of this can be seen by looking at the
destruction of the New England groundfish fisheries and the one-third
decrease of the stocks managed by the regional councils since the
Magnuson Act went into effect." -Specifically in regard to the Bering
Sea, the NMFS and NOAA openly admit that they have not used many
of the available tools to "manage and conserve" the Bering Sea's
resources on an ecosystem level. For example, one NMFS/NOAA
official stated, "[w]e are managing the Bering Sea fisheries pretty much
on a species basis, without really knowing what effects the exploitation
of one species may have on other species or other species conflicts." 53
Some assert that managing species using an "ad hoc" approach is
beneficial and successful." The costs of this approach, however, are
that it undermines customary international law, it is ineffective, 55 it leads
to economic inefficiencies, 56 and it has detrimental effects on the
ecosystem as a whole. In the pollock fishery, vessels fishing for pollock
and cod discarded approximately 20 million pounds of halibut and more
than half a billion pounds of other species of groundfish.15 Thus, the
pollock fishery has adversely affected other major groundfish species in
the Bering ecosystem. With regard to the pollock by-catch in the Bering
151. Despite the fact that some recently held the belief that, "our groundfish
resource is healthy," Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 50, the general consensus
is that a "situation of serious environmental concern" exists regarding the pollock fishery
in the Bering Sea. Id. at 35. See also Canfield, supra note 47; Mirovitskaya & Haney,
supra note 1, at 246-7.
152. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 55.
153. Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 36 (opening remarks by Dr. James
Brooks, Deputy Director, NMFS/NOAA Alaska Office). He also stated, however,
"We're doing some ecosystem modeling ... but the results of this modeling have not yet
been translated into fishery management decisions ...." Id.
154. Id. at 54 (statement by Dr. Clarence Pautzke, Executive Director NPFMC).
See also id. at 77 (statement by David Benton, Office of the Commissioner, Alaska
Department of Fish and Game).
155. See, e.g., Belsky, supra note 1, at 451 (stating that the impact of the "ad hoc"
approach has been "unimpressive.")
156. Ad hoc management, which has been the practice thus far, has led to "derby
fishing" which "reduces crew and vessel safety, reduces the quality of fish delivered to
the market, ... [and leads to] over capitalization ... and tremendous by-catch waste."
Canfield, supra note 47, at 258. For example, in the halibut fishery about 200 schooners
worked the grounds in the 1970s, by 1989 it was 7,000, and by 1992, over 11,000. Id.
157. Id.
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Sea, roughly 245 million pounds of undersize fish were discarded dead
in 1992.111 In January 1994, the North Pacific Fishery Management
Council voted to require more observers on pollock vessels to combat
this problem. 5 9
The question, with regard to customary international law, remains:
Do the actions of the United States, not its foreign policy or treaty
statements, support or undermine the notion that a customary interna-
tional law norm is actually emerging, and what effect will U.S. action or
non-action have on the Bering ecosystem and international law in
general? An answer may lie in progress that has been made in an area
called the Donut Hole.
The Donut Hole is a pocket of international high seas, comprising
roughly 50,000 square miles or less than 10 per cent of the Bering Sea,
between the U.S. and Russian EEZs. ° Because all of the pollock in the
Bering Sea are generally accepted to "constitute a single complex within
the Bering Sea ecosystem," ' unregulated fishing in this area is of great
158. Most of these were undersized fish and were dead by the time they were
thrown back. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 43 (testimony of David Benton, Director
of External Affairs, Alaska Department of Fish and Game).
159. The requirement was passed specifically to reduce the chum salmon bycatch,
EUGENE H. BUCK, MARINE FISHERIES ISSUES, 93004, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF (updated February 10, 1994).
160. See Figure 1, p. 165 of this Comment. Convention on the Conservation and
Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea Before the Sen. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, (testimony of David A. Colson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Oceans Affairs) 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
CONGTST File. See also Bering Sea Pollock Convention, supra note 31, at 26, which
states, "The Specific Area is the area south of a straight line between a point at 55
degrees 46 minutes N. and 170 degrees W. and a point at 54 degrees 30 minutes N. and
167 degrees W., and between the meridian 167 degrees W. and the meridian 170 degrees
W., and north of the Aleutian Islands and straight lines between the islands connecting
the following coordinates in the order listed: 52 degrees 49.2 minutes N. 169 degrees
40.4 minutes W., 52 degrees 49.8 minutes N. 169 degrees 06.3 minutes W., 53 degrees
23.8 minutes N. 167 degrees 50.1 minutes W., 53 degrees 18.7 minutes N. 167 degrees
51.4 minutes W." Id. For a discussion of the Donut Hole problems, this author also
relies in large part on James Canfield, supra note 47.
161. Mirovitskaya & Haney, supra note 1, at 244. This premise, however, is not
unchallenged in the scientific community. E.g., Alexander Golovkin, head of the Soviet
Union's endangered species program in 1991 maintained, "the Bering Sea holds four
distinct stocks, each requiring different harvest times and limits." Yereth Rosen, Alaska
Fisheries Depleted by Foreign Fleets, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 5, 1991, at 7. In
any event, even if the stocks are not connected, unregulated fishing of separate stocks
is still a problem and concern.
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importance. This is because overfishing in the Donut Hole could damage
or destroy all pollock fishing in the entire North Pacific, including the
U.S. EEZ.
In the Donut Hole, pollock catches increased from about 100,000
metric tons in 1984 to almost 1.4 million in 1988.16 This increase
reflects the larger trend in pollock fishing as discussed above. However,
the disturbing fact about the increase in pollock landings in the Donut
Hole are the drastic decreases which followed immediately on the heels
of the increases. For example, in 1990, the harvest dropped to 917,371
metric tons, in 1991, to 293,399 metric tons," and in 1992, less than
11,000 tons were harvested."6
This precipitous decline led to a series of negotiations between
interested fishing nations. These talks in turn led to an agreement to
suspend pollock fishing in the Bering Sea Donut Hole entirely during
1993 and 1994.11 As a result of these conferences, a treaty, "The
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources
in the Central Bering Sea" (Bering Sea Pollock Convention) was
concluded and opened for signature on June 16, 1994.11 It was signed
by all negotiating parties by August 25, 1994.167 As one scholar has
noted, agreements like this are evidence that norms, such as the duty of
high seas fishing states to co-operate espoused in LOS and the Draft
Agreement on Straddling Stocks, also exist as customary international
law. 1
The Bering Sea negotiations and the ultimate agreement the states
reached can be said to exemplify the development of customary
international law regarding marine ecosystems. The problem remains,
however of whether internal practices in the United States will reflect the
162. Canfield, supra note 47, at 261.
163. Id. at 270.
164. Bering Sea Pollock Convention, supra note 31, at 3 (Letter of Submittal).
165. For a detailed discussion of the conferences and background on The Conven-
tion for the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering
Sea, see Hearing on Central Bering Sea Convention, supra note 125. See also Canfield,
supra note 47, at 257-289.
166. Hearing on Central Bering Sea Convention, supra note 125. The Convention
was signed by the United States, the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China,
and the Republic of Korea on June 16, 1994, by Japan on Aug. 4, 1994, and by Poland
on Aug. 25, 1994. Id.
167. Id.
168. Canfield, supra note 47, at 271.
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ideas agreed upon in treaties such as the Bering Sea Pollock
Convention.' 9 The United States provided leadership in the Pollock
Convention negotiations by trying to regulate pollock fishing in the
Donut Hole 7' and by restricting the pollock catch in its own Bering
EEZ.' 7' These actions, however, while evidence of international co-
operation seem to be species-specific at this point in time. With regard
to the Bering Sea Pollock Convention, no other living marine resource
is mentioned in the text of the treaty other than pollock. In the federal
regulations limiting the domestic pollock harvest, no mention is made of
the interdependence of species or the effect pollock fishing has on the
environment. The U.S. practice seems to reflect actions that are being
taken to protect the pollock resource, the single largest U.S. fishery, but
no actions being taken to protect the marine environment or ecosystem. ,72
169. As stated earlier this Comment focuses on the United States' policy in regard
to the Bering Sea ecosystem. The Russian EEZ contains the other geographically
significant territory besides the U.S. EEZ and the Donut Hole. A discussion of Russian
domestic policy is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, Russia is also carrying
out a policy with regard to Bering Sea fisheries and faces many of the same problems as
the United States, including a large number of bureaucratic organizations with
jurisdiction over various aspects of Bering Sea resources. See generally Bering Sea
Conference, supra note 19.
170. Hearing on Central Bering Sea Convention, supra note 125.
171. See Groundfish of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands, 50 C.F.R. § 675
(1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 35,476 (1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 675.25); 59 Fed.
Reg. 25,346 (1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 675); 59 Fed. Reg. 13,662 (1994) (to
be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 675.20); 59 Fed. Reg. 10,082 (1994) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. § 675.20); 59 Fed. Reg. 8869 (1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 675.20); and
59 Fed. Reg. 7656 (1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 675.20).
172. At the time of this writing hearings on the reauthorization of the Magnuson
Act are underway. Prof. John J. Magnuson, Jr., gave testimony on H.R. 39, a bill to
amend the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA). In his
testimony he addresses the failure and inadequacies of the Magnuson Act at length. He
stated, "Overall, ... fisheries management in the United States has not achieved the
conservation of fish stocks that was anticipated when the Act was passed originally in
1976." Magnuson Fishery Conservation and ManagementActAmendments: Hearings on
H.R. 39 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Widlife and Oceans of the House Comm. on
Resources, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 23, 1995) available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
CNGTST File.
Professor Magnuson went on to make recommendations for the improvement of the
Magnuson Act. He talked at length about the necessity to move toward "an ecosystem
approach to fishery management." Id. Some of his recommendations for improving
H.R. 39 were to "prevent overfishing, including controlling entry and capitalization and
further specifying the definition of optimum yield; improve institutional structure;
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The United States, when calling for a Bering Sea pollock convention,
issued statements which showed that it was aware of the effect pollock
overfishing could have on the marine environment. In fact, in 1992, two
full years before the Bering Sea Pollock Convention was concluded, the
White House stated that "the pollock resource in that region has suffered
a precipitous decline, which could upset the balance of the Bering Sea
Ecosystem as a whole."'" Despite these strong words, the Bering Sea
Pollock Convention does not mention the word ecosystem once in the
entire text. As will be demonstrated, only two provisions can be read to
consider anything besides pollock.
The Convention's objectives include "the optimum utilization of
pollock in the Convention Area," the restoration and maintenance of
pollock resources in the Bering Sea, cooperation in gathering and
examining information, and "if the Parties agree," the creation of a
forum to "consider the establishment of necessary conservation and
management measures for living marine resources other than pollock in
the Convention Area as may be required in the future."174 Thus, the last
improve the quality of fishery science and data; and move toward and ecosystem
approach to fishery management, including reducing bycatch, and protecting fish
habitats." Id. (emphasis added). While he praised some of the provisions in H.R. 39,
specifically those regarding by-catch and protecting fish habitats, he emphasized that
Congress needed to take further steps toward an ecosystem approach to fisheries
management:
including promoting multi-species approaches to fishery management-factor-
ing in nontarget species and ecosystem interactions among target fish and other
species, such as marine mammals and birds; developing a major national
program to define the environmental components essential for fish reproduc-
tion, survival, and production and to identify and understand current causes of
habitat degradation; and promoting various agencies with shared responsibility
under different federal and state laws to coordinate their efforts and programs
for habitat protection and management of habitat resources.
Id.
173. Joint Statement on the Bering Sea Released by the White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, (June 22, 1992) available in LEXIS, News Library, DSTATE File.
174. The objectives of this Convention shall be:
1. to establish an international regime for conservation, management and the
optimum utilization of pollock resources in the Convention Area;
2. to restore and maintain the pollock resources in the Bering Sea at levels
which will permit their maximum sustainable yield;
3. to cooperate in the gathering and examining of factual information concern-
ing pollock and other living marine resources in the Bering Sea; and
4. to provide, if the Parties agree, a forum in which to consider the establ-
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two objectives provide for data gathering on other living marine
resources and, if the parties agree, they may provide a forum to consider
conserving living marine resources in the future.
The Convention requires that an "Annual Conference" be held at
which "other appropriate conservation and management measures for the
pollock resources in the Conservatifn Area" are to be considered. 75
While "other measures" may include consideration of the effects of the
pollock harvest on the ecosystem, "other measures" may simply include
measures such as gear restrictions and fishing moratoriums on pollock.
The Annual Conference must also discuss "fishery support operations in
the Convention Area, including the environmental impact of such
operations." 76 This is the only mention of the environment in the treaty.
Strikingly absent is any mention of the word "ecosystem."
In sum, no mention is made of ecosystems or ecosystem management
in the text of the treaty,"7 in the Secretary of State's letter of submittal
to President Clinton,'78 or in the President's letter of transmittal to the
U.S. Senate.' 9 Thus, despite the President's earlier words regarding
potential danger to the Bering ecosystem of the pollock harvest, these
words were subordinated to the idea of providing for the maximum
sustainable yield of a single species-the Walleye Pollock.
Massive pollock harvests have not had a detrimental effect only on
the pollock. Strong evidence exists that other species in the ecosystem
have also suffered."s In fact, so great is the concern about the effects
of overfishing on the groundfish in the Bering ecosystem that in 1992 the
Governor of Alaska, Walter J. Hickel, stated, "The mismanagement of
the North Pacific pushes the fishermen to this destructive kind of fishing.
ishment of necessary conservation and management measures for living marine
resources other than pollock in the Convention Area as may be required in the
future.
Bering Sea Pollock Convention, supra note 31, art. IV(a)(c), at 69-70.
175. Bering Sea Pollock Convention, supra note 31, art. II, at 69.
176. Id. art. IV(1)(k), at 70.
177. Bering Sea Pollock Convention, supra note 31.
178. Id. at 3-6 (Letter of Submittal).
179. Id. at 1 (Letter of Transmittal).
180. See, e.g. Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 109-112 (statement by
Richard Townsend); Springer, supra note 119; John BaIzar, Industry's Feeding Frenzy
Perils Richest U.S. Fishery; Resources: A Showdown Looms Over Practices Some Fear
Could Turn North Pacific into a Barren Region, L.A. TIMEs, June 29, 1992, at Al;
Rosen, supra note 161.
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If it's allowed to go unchecked, pretty soon we'll have a barren ocean
floor ... a lifeless desert. 181
At a recent international conference on issues affecting the Bering
Sea, a Russian scientist's remarks mirrored the Governor's statement
about the U.S. management of its fishing industry. She criticized the
NMFS for its "anti-ecological approach" and asserted that it "assessed
and evaluated only from the human perspective, but 'not from the
perspective of the natural food chains that exist in nature.""
Perhaps the most dramatic effect of the massive pollock harvest in
the Bering Sea has been the precipitous decline in the population of the
Steller sea lion." In 1960, there were approximately 140,000 Steller sea
lions in the Bering Sea." iy 1992, the population had declined to only
about 20,000.1 While several theories exist as to why the Steller's
population has declined,'8 the answer may simply be that pollock is the
sea lions' major food source."s The North Pacific Fishery Management
181. Balzar, supra note 180.
182. Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 117 (paper by Lyudimilla
Bogolovskaya, USSR Severtsov Institute of Evolutionary Animal Morphology and
Ecology).
183. The Steller sea lion (Eumetopiasjubatus), also referred to as the northern sea
lion, was named after a German scientist, George Wilhelm Steller, who first documented
the species in 1742. Males can exceed 10 feet in length and a ton in weight. Holthouse,
supra note 8, at 34.
184. BUCK, supra note 119, at 11.
185. Id.
186. Natural changes in the ecosystem such as changes in the prey species, (i.e.,
herring), may have contributed to the decline. Id. However, it has also been argued that
the Steller has had to switch to feeding on pollock because herring and capelin, its proper
food sources, were overfished by the Japanese in the 1950's and 1960's. Rosen, supra,
note 160. A theory has also been advanced that increased predation by killer whales has
lead to the decline. BUCK, supra note 119, at 11. Finally, the NPFMC suggests that
other factors besides the groundfish harvest which have caused a decline in the Steller's
population include: (1) a westward shift of their distribution out of the Bering ecosystem
into a different area, (2) disease such as leptospirosis, and (3) "other unknown population
control factors." NPFMC PLAN, supra note 21, at 10-2.
187. NPFMC Plan, supra note 21, at 10-2. Another disturbing trend is that the
Steller is disappearing at the core of its habitat (coincidentally where the heavy pollock
fishing occurs), rather than at the fringes, which would be more normal for a marine
mammal fluctuation. Holthouse, supra note 8, at 36 (statement of Lloyd Lowry, Marine
Mammal coordinator for the Alaska Department of Fish and Game's Division of Wildlife
Conservation). In 1986, a study by the Alaska department of Fish and Game also
revealed that Steller sea lions weighed less and showed signs of malnutrition during
periods of heavy pollock harvest. Id.
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Council has even recognized that because groundfish, principally pollock,
make up the majority of the Stellar's diet, the reduction in pollock will
have a significant impact on the sea lion's population."u In addition to
causing the destruction of their primary food source, pollock fishing has
had many other side effects on the sea lions. More than 20,000 sea lions
were killed incidentally in trawl fisheries between 1966 and 1988.11
Also, disturbance and harassment by fishing vessels may have affected
the reproduction of many of the remaining sea lions."l
The North Pacific Fishery Management Council has acknowledged
in its fishery management plan the effect the pollock fishery has had on
the Steller Sea lion by creating protective no-trawl buffer zones around
sea lion rookeries. 91 In these buffer zones, trawling is totally banned
within 10 nautical miles of the rookeries during the entire year, and
within 20 nautical miles during the winter pollock fishing season."9
However, it is too early to tell whether these measures will have a
significant effect on their food source.193
188. NPFMC PLAN, supra note 21, Annex IV, atAIV 2-3. The feeding habits of
the Steller sea lion are reflected in this NPFMC plan as follows: In one study fish
comprised 97.6 percent of the diet of individual sea lions, with cephalopods and decapod
crustaceans following at 2 percent and 0.6 percent respectively. In another study, fish
comprised 74.2 percent of the diet with cephalopods and decapod crustaceans following
at 17.2 percent and 8.6 percent respectively. In both studies pollock was the dominant
groundfish. Id.
189. BUCK, supra note 119, at 11.
190. NOAA TECH. MEM., supra, note 124, at 174.
191. NPFMC PLAN, supra note 21, at 26.
192. Id.
193. There is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the ecological ramifications of
the pollock harvest on the Steller sea lion and on commercial fishing activities. The
NMFS, NPFMC, and independent scientists are aware of this and stress the need for
further data regarding the effect of the pollock harvest. In addition, the NMFS itself
continuously revises its rules because of the uncertainty of the ecological effect of the
pollock harvest on other species of fish and marine mammals. See e.g., NPFMC
SUMMARY, supra note 21, at § 9; 50 C.F.R. pts. 611, 675, 676 (1994) (when specifying
the allowance for pollock the Secretary and NPFMC must consider the current estimates
and changes in marine mammal stocks, the impacts of pollock fishing on marine
mammals, and the "need to obtain fishery data...."); 50 C.F.R. pt. 675 (1994) (NMFS
implementation of a regulatory amendment to require increased data gathering in Bering
Sea pollock fisheries); 50 C.F.R. pt. 675 (1994) (emergency regulation regarding the
need for additional data and the effect of the pollock harvest on chum salmon because
six times the expected by-catch was discovered); See generally Bering Sea Conference,
supra note 19.
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In addition, the NMFS listed the Steller sea lion as "threatened"
under the Endangered Species Act on November 26, 1990. ' Recently,
NMFS begun an investigation into whether the sea lion should be
reclassified as "endangered."'" Ultimately, however, managing the
Steller sea lion as a species, without taking into account the effect of the
pollock fishery and other ecosystemic factors (i.e. pollution, other parts
of its diet, etc.) is a management system that is doomed to fail. As
theorized, it is contrary to the emerging customary international law
norm of ecosystem management, and, like management of the pollock
fishery, this approach of the NMFS appears not to recognize that all
species in the ecosystem are interconnected. Simply listing a species as
"endangered" or "threatened" does not get at the root of the problem
which is the destruction of its food source. The environmental
organization Greenpeace recognized this underlying problem and
challenged the limits on pollock fishing "out of concern over the fate of
the Steller sea lion."'96
In Greenpeace Action v. Franklin,"9' Greenpeace argued that the
federal government should reduce the pollock harvest in the Bering
ecosystem because of its detrimental effect on the Steller sea lion. 9'
Greenpeace contended that the NMFS's own data demonstrated that
pollock fishing was the "leading factor" in the continuous decrease in the
number of Steller sea lions in the Bering ecosystem."9
Pursuant to the Magnuson Act, the North Pacific Fishery Manage-
ment Council publicizes an annual total allowable catch (TAC) of pollock
and recommends that amount to the Secretary. The preliminary TAC
becomes final when it is approved by the Secretary. In 1991, the pollock
season opened under the preliminary TAC because the Secretary had not
194. 55 Fed. Reg. 49,204 (1990).
195. 58 Fed. Reg. 3,008 (1993).
196. Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 982 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1992).
"Greenpeace sought an order directing the Secretary to comply with the Act [ESA] by
ensuring that the continued harvest of pollock 'is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence ... of the threatened Steller sea lion' and by preparing 'a legally and
scientifically adequate biological opinion ... concerning risks posed by pollock fishing'
to the Steller sea lion." Id. at 1347.
197. Id.
198. Id. Greenpeace may have had an unstated broader goal, i.e. perhaps the
organization sought protection for the entire ecosystem, but the only "hook" they had was
the "threatened" status of the Steller under the ESA. Id.
199. Id. at 1345.
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yet approved it. Greenpeace challenged the recommended 1991 TAC
because it represented an increase of 66 percent, or approximately
55,600 metric tons of pollock, over the 1990 TAC.2°  Greenpeace
theorized that the increase in the pollock TAC was a federal action that
jeopardized the "threatened" Steller sea lion."0  In March, 1991, the
Secretary entered into consultation with the NMFS, as required by the
ESA, in order to evaluate the impact that the North Pacific Fishery
Management Council's recommended 66 percent increase in the pollock
catch on the Steller sea lion. Ultimately, in June 1991, the Secretary
adopted a TAC for 1991 which represented an increase of 41 percent
over the 1990 TAC.2° Greenpeace filed suit a week later.'
Greenpeace presented two principal legal arguments which reflected
the idea of ecosystem management. 4  In both of these arguments,
Greenpeace used some of the domestic tools mentioned above, for the
purpose of protecting the Steller sea lion and reducing the pollock
harvest.
First, Greenpeace alleged that the determination of the total
allowable pollock catch for 1991 violated the ESA "because it was done
without preparation of an adequate biological opinion and without
consideration of the best available scientific ... data concerning the status
of the fishery and its potential impact on the Stellar sea lion."'
Greenpeace, in essence, argued that the duty the ESA imposes on an
agency is "a duty to 'insure' that any action it takes is 'not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence' of a threatened species."'  This
argument reflects the idea of ecosystem management because it is evident
that Greenpeace is primarily concerned with the pollock harvest and is
200. Id. at 1346; Holthouse, supra note 8, at 38.
201. Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 982 F.2d at 1346-7.
202. Id.; Holthouse, supra note 8, at 38.
203. Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 982 F.2d at 1347. Holthouse, supra note 8,
at 38.
204. Greenpeace has long been a supporter of an ecosystemic approach to fishery
management. See e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 1 at 110-114. In addition to
Greenpeace, other environmental organizations often seek to protect an ecosystem,
through the ESA, as it is one of the few domestic legal tools available to them. See e.g.,
Northern Spotted Owl v. Donald Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988); Northern
Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991). The environmental
organizations' ultimate goal was larger than protecting the spotted owl, it was preser-
vation of the old growth forest ecosystem in the pacific northwest. Id.
205. Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 982 F.2d at 1347.
206. Id. at 1354.
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using the Steller sea lion as a means of attacking pollock fishing to
preserve the ecosystem.
Second, Greenpeace challenged the National Marine Fisheries
Service's conclusion that an environmental impact statement considering
the effects of the proposed pollock harvests on the Steller sea lion was
not needed. Greenpeace argued an EIS was necessary because pollock
fishing was the "leading factor" in the sea lion's decline.' Greenpeace
reasoned that the "implementation of the TAC without preparation of an
EIS ... violated NEPA" because it was a major federal action and thus
required an EIS.101
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "the Service has
undeniably fulfilled its duties under the ESA,"I that its conclusions were
"supported ... with ample data and analysis," and that the NMFS actions
were not arbitrary and capricious.21° The court held that the total
allowable catch which the North Pacific Fishery Management Council
had set for pollock 1 did not violate the ESA because it was based on the
best scientific data available.212
The court further held that the setting of the TAC did not require an
environmental impact statement because the NMFS based its "Finding of
No Significant Impact" on a "careful look at the effects of the 1991
fishery on the Steller sea lion. "213 The court recognized that "some
scientists dispute the Service's analysis and conclusions," nevertheless
held that Greenpeace did not make a sufficient showing that the NMFS's
determination that the pollock harvest had "no significant impact" on the
Steller was "arbitrary and capricious. "214 Therefore, using this highly
207. Id. at 1345.
208. Id. at 1347.
209. Id. at 1356.
210. Id. at 1355.
211. Every September the Council makes public a preliminary Stock Assess-
ment and Fishery Evaluation report, as well as preliminary specifications for
the acceptable biological catch (ABC) and the total allowable catch (TAC).
The ABC is the measure of the size of the catch that the ecosystem can sustain.
The TAC is the total tonnage of fish that fishermen may retain in a particular
year.
Id.
212. Id. at 1356.
213. Id. at 1354.
214. Id. at 1355.
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deferential standard of review, the court granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment.1 5
As a result of the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Greenpeace Action v.
Franklin, NEPA litigation in that jurisdiction seems unavailable as a
means of requiring an agency to consider the ecosystemic effects of its
management decisions. If the agency has used its expertise to support its
findings, then courts will defer to its findings. Thus, as long as the
agency acts in a manner that is not "arbitrary and capricious" its actions
will be upheld. With some courts unwilling to interfere in agency
decision making, it appears clear that the agency itself must act to
manage on an ecosystem level. While much of the domestic legislation
cited above gives federal agencies these tools, agency actions like those
taken in Greenpeace v. Franklin can be looked to for an indication of
how the federal government is actually functioning. In its ruling, the
Ninth Circuit effectively narrowed the scope of the domestic legal
authority requiring the government to consider the effect that managing
a species may have on interdependent, and even threatened, species in
the same ecosystem. So far, Congress has not acted to change this
ruling.
Perhaps litigation such as that instigated by Greenpeace has had some
positive effect. It may have forced the NMFS to take a closer look at
the North Pacific Fishery Management Council's recommended TAC2 .6
and may have expedited agency action establishing "no trawl" zones
around sea lion rookeries in the Bering Sea. The final TAC the
Secretary adopted in fact called for a 10 nautical mile no-trawl zone
around Steller sea lion rookeries, because the "effects of pollock
harvesting on the Steller sea lion's ability to obtain food [a]re
215. Id. at 1366. The highly deferential standard of review the court used may be
contrary to ESA case law such as TVA v. Hill which, as stated above, was meant to "halt
and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost." 437 U.S. at 184.
See e.g., Fishermen's Dock Corp. v. Brown, 867 F. Supp. 385 (D.Va. 1994). How-
ever, a critique of the court's reasoning regarding the standard of review or an analysis
of different court's interpretations of NEPA of ESA case law is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
216. The year the TAC was challenged was the only time the NMFS modified a
recommended TAC by the NPFMC. Until that point in time, it had approved every
recommendation without modification. Holthouse, supra note 8, at 38.
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uncertain."" 7 Thus, it can be argued that the lawsuit by Greenpeace
forced the Secretary to take a closer look at the impact of the pollock
harvest on the Steller sea lion than if Greenpeace had not objected to the
Council's proposed recommendation. The Secretary reduced the TAC
below the NPFMC's recommendation and instituted no-trawl zones for
pollock fishing vessels. However, while the protection of specific sea
lion rookeries on an ad hoc basis is indicative of agency concern for a
threatened species, it does not evince a standard of ecosystem manage-
ment, nor do these actions seem to indicate that the United States is
abiding by the evolving customary international law norm of ecosystem
management.
Greenpeace tried to require the agency to take the Bering ecosystem
into consideration and to complete an EIS. The agency, through its
actions, concentrated solely on the allowable harvest of pollock and
found that an EIS was not even necessary. This clearly shows that the
NMFS was concerned almost exclusively with the pollock harvest, and
not its effects on the Bering ecosystem because the NMFS expressly
refused to consider the environmental alternatives by doing an EIS. In
addition, the Court found that the Secretary's biological opinion
regarding the effect of the pollock harvest on the Steller sea lion was
backed up by the data. The result was an increase in the total allowable
catch of pollock relative to the previous year. The agency's inaction and
unwillingness to prepare an EIS and its approval of an increase in the
pollock harvest takes a concrete step away from abiding by the interna-
tional law norm of ecosystem management.
In addition to the Steller sea lion, other species in the Bering
ecosystem have suffered drastic declines in recent years. Harbor seals2 8
off the coast of Alaska have declined markedly.21 9 Near Kodiak Island,
in the Gulf of Alaska, there were an estimated 22,800 Harbor seals in
1978. By 1992, that number had decreased by roughly 90 percent to
2,899. ° In addition, the northern fur seal"2 in the Bering region is
217. Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 982 F.2d at 1346. This does not, however,
exemplify the "precautionary approach" to straddling stock fishing as outlined in the
Draft Agreement, see supra Sec. U of this Comment.
218. Phoca vitulina.
219. David Hulen, Alaska: Harbor Seal Populations Plunging in Gulf of Alaska,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEws, Jan. 16, 1994.
220. BUCK, supra note 119, at 11.
221. Callorhinus ursinus.
1995]
182 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:141
currently at less than 40 per cent of its population in the mid-1950s.m
These species both feed on pollock.1
Even more disturbing is the precipitous decline in the number of
seabirds in the Bering Sea ecosystem. Pollock are an important source
of food to seabirds in the Bering Sea, ' 4 and seabirds are an integral
component of the marine ecosystem.' For example, seabird excrement
stimulates the development of phytoplankton in the waters near their
nests.' While it has been estimated that 750,000 seabirds are caught
every year in drift nets,' and that pollution kills significant numbers,'
these figures alone cannot account for the estimated declines of seabirds
in the Bering Sea. For example, the population of the red-legged
kittiwake, a species unique to the Bering Sea ecosystem, declined by
about 50 per cent between 1976 and 1989.29 The populations of thick
billed and common murres have similarly declined." In addition, a
complete reproductive failure of red and black legged kittiwakes on St.
George Island was recorded in an April, 1989, FWS study. 1 While the
decline in these bird species has not been specifically linked to the
decline in pollock, some would argue that just as the Steller's link to the
decline in the number of pollock cannot be easily proved, a similar
inference can be drawn. In fact, one expert explicitly stated that the
reason that some bird species have declined by 80 percent since the
1970s "is lack of fish." 232
It is clear, however, that factors other than overfishing contribute to
the decline of mammal and sea bird populations in the Bering Sea. As
222. OUR LIVING OCEANS, supra note 1, at 102.
223. NPFMC SUMMARY, supra note 21, Annex IV, at AlV 4, 7.
224. NPFMC PLAN, supra note 21, at 9-1.
225. See e.g., Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 152-55 (paper by
Alexander Golovkin, Priroda Scientific Research Institute Goskompriroda, describing
disastrous effects on ecosystems as a result of a decline in seabird populations).
226. Id. at 154.
227. Mirovitskaya & Haney, supra note 1, at 248 n.20.
228. For example, it is estimated that up to 300,000 seabirds died as a result of the
Valdez oil spill. Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 171.
229. Yereth Rosen, Commercial Fishing Harvests Lead to Bering Sea Area Wildlife
Decline, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1991, at B6.
230. Holthouse, supra note 8, at 34.
231. Rosen, supra note 229, at B6. The red-legged Kittiwake is located almost
entirely on St. George Island in the Pribilofs. Id.
232. Rosen, supra note 161, at 7.
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stated above, oil spills and drift nets, 3 as well as other forms of marine
pollution such as plastic cast-off from vessels,' sewageP 5 and heavy
metals 6 contribute to the damage being done to the habitat 37 and
ecosystem in general. In addition, off-shore mining and oil exploration
take their toll on the marine environment." In fact, of the more than
6,000 oil exploration permits filed nationwide, the Mineral Management
Service has never turned one down, 9 leading some to call the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act' "a mandate to drill."'I The Bering Sea
is not immune from any of these problems.242
All of these risks to the environment, however, do not mean that the
United States is excused from managing pollock fishing in the Bering Sea
in accordance with international law. On the contrary, because all
commercial and ecological issues are so interconnected, the United States
should be even more sensitive to managing the Bering Sea on an
ecosystem level. A possible solution may be to bring all of these
competing policies and bureaucracies under a common umbrella, with a
common policy to protect all of the region's resources.
This may require designating a new organization with specific
authority over all "actions" in ecosystems. This organization could give
a particular marine ecosystem, such as the Bering Sea, the same degree
233. Of special concern is "ghost fishing," lost or abandoned drift nets. It has
been estimated that 12 miles are lost per day, which amounts to approximately 4100
miles per year in the North Pacific. Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 164.
234. "Tons" of plastic cast off from fishing vessels has washed up on the shores of
some Alaska beaches. Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 159.
235. Id. at 173 (statement of Victor Naumov, Magadan Oblast Committee on
Nature Protection).
236. These metals, primarily mercury, result from off-shore gold mining and effect
the ecosystem by accumulating in marine animals and humans which eat these resources.
Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 168-72 (statement of Dennis Kelso,
Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation).
237. The effects of changes in the habitat are important under domestic law because
16 U.S.C. § 1543 states that the more restrictive provision of the ESA or MMPA
applies. 16 U.S.C. § 1543 (1988). See also supra notes 107-110 and accompanying
text.
238. Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 168-72.
239. Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 230 (statement by Eric Smith,
attorney, representing environmental and native interests).
240. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1988).
241. Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 231 (statement by Eric Smith,
attorney, representing environmental and native interests).
242. See generally, Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19.
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of protection that a species has under the ESA.243 This organization
could be international, like the Deep Seabed Mining Authority in
Jamaica, or, it could be a domestic entity. If it were a domestic agency,
it would have jurisdiction over all U.S. waters.' The NMFS might be
the logical choice because it is the governmental agency responsible for
the oversight of the Magnuson Act, the MMPA and the ESA in the
marine context. 2A5 Therefore, it would be the agency best suited to
comply with the NEPA mandate of an integrated approach to ocean
planning and decision making.
V. CONCLUSION
Can we say that an international legal duty to manage and conserve
marine resources on an ecosystem level is emerging? In theory, perhaps.
This duty appears to be clear if we look to U.S. policy statements, its
signing of treaties such as LOS and its participation in other international
conferences and agreements which focus on environmental or ecosys-
temic conservation and co-operation. All these actions and agreements
may be seen as state practice supporting an emerging duty to solve
marine resource issues in a co-operative way and in a global manner.
Can we say that this duty exists? Not yet. 6
While international and domestic tools to "conserve and manage" the
Bering ecosystem do currently exist and U.S. policy seems to reflect
support for this idea, it appears that the United States is not yet
aggressively pursuing this course of action in practice.24 However, it is
simply too early to tell whether or not the U.S. will abide by the
emerging customary international law norm of ecosystem management.
243. For the degree of protection a species has under the ESA see TVA v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153 (1977).
244. Professor Belsky suggests that it could also be helpful to form an entirely new
National Ocean Policy Commission with the power to set the agenda over all our nations
oceans. See Belsky, supra note 1, at 447.
245. OUR LIVING OCEANS, supra note 1, at 3.
246. The increase in the factory trawler fleet in the Bering Sea from 12 ships to 65
since 1986 and the $90 billion the world's countries spend to land $72 billion worth of
fish are a stark reminder of how far the U.S. and the earth's other nations still must
travel before the conservation language of documents such as LOS, the Draft Agreement
on Straddling Stocks, and the Bering Sea Pollock Convention become a reality.
247. E.g., Bering Sea Conference, supra note 19, at 113 (paper by Richard
Townsend, consultant for the Center for Marine Conservation stating that the U.S. has
been reluctant to use the tools available to it).
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The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has just entered
into force. It will take time to see whether its entire text, including its
so-called codified customary law provisions are being followed as
binding international law. In addition, the Draft Agreement on
Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks still must undergo
at least two more substantive working sessions and be implemented. 2m
Domestic practice and the international agreements in which the
United States has participated seem to be consistent with regard to fishing
at this point in time.249 When a fishery is on the verge of collapse, the
United States, in its individual capacity and in its treaties with other
states, simply bans or limits fishing for the particular species that is at
risk of being overexploitedY 0 While no solid evidence of U.S. action
to manage the Bering Sea on an ecosystem level currently exists, its
conduct through participation in international agreements may indicate a
slow evolution towards acceptance of the emerging customary norm
requiring states to consider the entire ecosystem when managing marine
resources. For example, the Draft Agreement on Straddling Stocks and
LOS show that the United States and other nations realize that they must
solve the world's marine problems globally, through cooperation, taking
into account the environment. Current international agreements like
these can be looked to for support of this idea.
Today, commercial fishing is still of primary importance and drives
the economic engine in the Bering Sea. Yet this does not mean that the
Bering ecosystem should be allowed to go the way of the Grand Banks.
It is important that the United States lead by example and "manage and
conserve" fisheries on an ecosystem level, rather than the ad hoe
management system which has prevailed thus far. If the current
248. Conference on Straddling Stocks, supra note 36, at 12. These sessions
occurred after this Comment had gone to press.
249. E.g., Canada's actions regarding fishing in the area of the Georges Banks;
U.S. limitations on salmon fishing and agreements with Japan regarding that salmon;
U.S. negotiations to close areas such as the Donut Hole in 1993 and 1994; and the
Bering Sea Pollock Convention.
250. See generally, Bering Sea Pollock Convention, supra note 31. Examples of
this method of problem "solution" also include the ban on pollock fishing in the Donut
Hole during 1993 and 1994, and domestic reduction of the pollock TAC in the U.S.
EEZ. See also, note 171, for a listing of Federal Register citations to groundfish
regulations in the Bering Sea.
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conservation and management system continues,211 not only will
America's last rich fishing grounds continue to be troubled waters, but
the principles outlined in this Comment will never be considered binding
international law, and all of the fisheries on the planet will continue to
be in danger.
251. Of the 232 domestic fish stocks, the NMFS can determine the status of only
two-thirds, and of those two-thirds 42 per cent are overutilized. Senate Hearing, supra
note 1, at 12. Worldwide it is estimated that 13 the planet's 17 major fisheries are
"commercially depleted" or in "serious decline." Nickerson, supra note 124, at 1.
